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ANKARA: Metsamor - The Fukushima of the Caucasus?

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  • ANKARA: Metsamor - The Fukushima of the Caucasus?

    Journal of Turkish Weekly, Turkey
    Aug 24 2012


    Metsamor - The Fukushima of the Caucasus?


    Friday, 24 August 2012

    by Rafiga Gurbanzade, Contributor

    Last year's catastrophic earthquake and tsunami off the coast of Japan
    and the subsequent Fukushima Daiichi nuclear meltdown highlighted the
    importance of a diligent assessment of nuclear power plants (NPP) to
    endure ground shakings or possible displacements [1]. According to the
    USGS, around 90 to 95 percent of the world's earthquakes occur on the
    boundaries of the tectonic plates as a way of releasing energy that
    builds up through the plate interaction [2]. While the knowledge about
    interaction of tectonic plates helps to identify seismically active
    regions, predicting an exact place and time of an earthquake remains
    impossible. This diminishes the chances of a proper warning and
    evacuation of populations ahead of a catastrophe. The problem is even
    more severe in countries with economic hardships [3].

    Similar to Japan, the South Caucasus region of Eurasia is a zone of
    high seismic activity. The Arabian and Eurasian tectonic plates
    collide here generating regular destructive earthquakes across the
    Caucasus, eastern Turkey and northwestern Iran[4]. On December 7,
    1988, two ground shocks with three seconds apart left at least 25,000
    people dead, 19,000 injured and 500,000 homeless in the
    Leninakan-Spitak-Kirovakan area of northern Armenia, then a Soviet
    republic.The magnitude of the earthquake was estimated at 6.8, while
    the damage was estimated at about 16.2 billion U.S. dollars. The
    disaster severely damaged infrastructure within the affected areas of
    Armenia and the neighboring Kelbajar region of Azerbaijan. The shocks
    were felt in Armenia's capital, Yerevan, in neighboring Georgia and as
    far as the Russian North Caucasus [5].Following the catastrophe,
    concerns intensified over the only NPP built by the Soviet government
    in the Caucasus region - the Metsamor (also known as Oktemberyan) NPP
    in Armenia.Built in 1976 with two VVER-440 Model V230 nuclear
    reactors, the structures of the plant resembled those of the Chernobyl
    NPP [6].

    In the former Soviet Union, the most commonly constructed reactors
    were the RBMK and VVER. The RBMK reactor, which was utilized in
    Chernobyl and exploded in April 1986, was a water-cooled and
    graphite-moderated reactor. In this type of reactors, the fuel
    elements can be exchanged while the reactors are powered. Such
    reactors are considered to be the world's most dangerous because of
    the risk of a fire in the graphite moderator and the absence of safety
    containment [7]. The VVERs are known as pressurized water reactors
    that utilize light water as both the moderator and the coolant [8].
    These reactors were developed in three generations. The first
    generation was developed in 1960s (reactor 440/230), the second, in
    early 1980s (reactor 440/213), and the third in late 1980s
    (reactor1000). The first two generations of VVER-440 are thought by
    the international experts to be the unsafe of all three because the
    reactors had no safety containment. Also, the cooling systems were
    considered to be unsafe [9].

    Similar to Chernobyl's RBMK, the VVER-440 reactors of Metsamor lack
    safety containment structures and are single-walled. The function of a
    single-walled containment is to carry the pressure load preventing it
    from rising above the designed pressure limit [10].Compared to the
    single-wall containment, the double-wall containment better controls
    any possible leakage through the inner containment by collecting it in
    `the annulus between inner and outer shell' [11]. Therefore, in case
    of an accident, a double-walled containment would maintain the leakage
    under a negative pressure, which would facilitate the collection,
    filtering and rejection of the radioactive leakages. Hence, lacking
    key safety features, single-walled RBMK and VVER type reactors present
    a high risk of radioactive release during an accident [12].

    After the 1988 earthquake, in fear of Chernobyl-like disasters, the
    Metsamor NPP was shut down. But the urge to reopen it arose during the
    1991-94 Nagorno-Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan. As the
    Armenian forces occupied parts of Azerbaijan, the latter blocked
    energy supplies, leaving Armenia's population without electricity
    during the harsh winter seasons. Subsequently, Armenian authorities
    were forced to reopen the two Metsamor reactors in 1993 and 1995 [13].
    Since 2003, the NPP has been operated by the Russian Inter RAO UES,
    owned by Russia's State Nuclear Energy Corporation (RosAtom), in
    return for repaying Armenia's $40 million debt to the Russian
    nuclear-fuel suppliers [14].

    Located in a highly active seismic zone and built according to the
    outdated Soviet standards, the Metsamor became a subject of severe
    safety concerns from Armenia's neighbors - Turkey, whose border is
    only 10 miles away from the NPP, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Numerous
    requests by these countries to permit their specialists for examining
    the plant were declined [15]. In 2011, Azerbaijan moved for a
    resolution in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
    stating that Armenia had refused `the EU's call for Metsamor to be
    shut down by 2011 at the latest and its offer of 100 million euros to
    help meet the country's energy needs' [16]. Further, the motion noted
    that in case of an accident at the Metsamor NPP, destructive
    consequences in Armenia, the South Caucasus, the Middle East and
    Europe would be inevitable.

    Armenian government asserts that the shutdown of the old reactors is
    expected in 2016 after a new facility will be built. Nevertheless, a
    risk of an accident during the coming four years continues to put
    Armenia under pressure [17]. In response to renewed concerns after the
    Fukushima Daiichi disaster, the Armenian government invited inspectors
    from the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA). The IAEA assembled
    and sent an Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) of 11 experts. In
    its June 2011 report, the OSART noted `good plant practices' at the
    Metsamor and highlighted that `during the last number of years,
    several important safety systems have been updated using resources of
    the plant's staff' (IAEA Press Release). However, the OSART report
    also found a number of deficiencies and the head of OSART mission,
    Gabor Vamos, claimed that identifying deficiencies in need of an
    urgent repair is a challenge to the Metsamor technicians. He also
    suggested that a more meticulous mechanism is needed to keep the plant
    in an ideal state [18].

    Despite the inspection, the EU continues still insist `on the earliest
    possible closure of the Metsamor NPP and on the adoption of a detailed
    decommissioning plan based on the [OSART] tests.' As stated further in
    the European Neighborhood Policy Package, Country Progress Report (for
    Armenia) of May 2012, the Metsamor NPP `cannot be upgraded to meet the
    internationally recognized nuclear safety standard' [19]. According to
    the All-Armenian Association of Power Specialists, Slavik Sargsian,
    `if a hazardous situation emerges at our plant, we have neither the
    capabilities nor the specialists to fight back' [20].

    In 2010, the European Parliament passed a resolution on the EU
    strategy for the South Caucasus [2009/221([INI)], in which it
    encouraged the Armenian authorities `to seek viable alternative
    solutions for energy supplies.' However, Russia now advances plans for
    a new NPP at the same location as the Metsamor and intends to
    generously invest in its construction. Sergei Kiriyenko, the head of
    RosAtom, recently said that his agency is ready to commit 20-25% of
    investments and more options could be discussed [21].

    Despite the mounting international pressure, Armenia is unlikely to
    shutdown the Metsamor NPP in a visible future. Firstly, the plant
    remains a critical source supplying some 40% of Armenia's energy
    demand amidst the ongoing conflict with neighboring energy-rich
    Azerbaijan. Secondly, the Metsamor NPP is owned and operated by
    Russia, which, in turn, is interested in using the plant as a trump
    card for defending its remaining strategic positions in the Caucasus.
    The closure of the Metsamor NPP is only possible if Armenia resolves
    its conflicts with Turkey and Azerbaijan, hence opening the country to
    the East-West Energy Corridor architected by the United States. This
    would deal a major blow to Russia's classical divide-and-conquer
    policy in the Caucasus, removing the last obstacle to region's
    economic integration with the West. As shown by its 2008 invasion of
    Georgia, Russia is ready to prevent this scenario at any cost. Based
    on the same logic, Russian government will spare no effort to keep the
    Metsamor NPP running for as long as possible even if the plant poses
    the gravest environmental threat to the region.

    References

    1. Kanaori, Y. (1997). Earthquake Proof Design and Active Faults.
    Elsevier, Amsterdam.

    2. Historic Earthquakes. Earthquake Hazards Program. U.S. Department
    of the Interior. (23 July 2012).
    http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/events/1988_12_07_ev.php

    3. Balassanian, S., Cisternas A., & Melkumyan M. (2000). Earthquake
    Hazard and Seismic Risk Reduction. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 169.

    4. Tan, O. & Taymaz, T. (2005). Active Tectonics of the Caucasus:
    Earthquake Source Mechanisms and Rupture Histories Obtained From
    Inversion of Teleseismic Body Waveforms. Geological Society of America
    Special Papers, 409, 531-578.
    http://specialpapers.gsapubs.org/content/409/531.abstract

    5. Historic Earthquakes. Earthquake Hazards Program. U.S. Department
    of the Interior. (23 July 2012).
    http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/events/1988_12_07.php

    6. Aloise G. & Jones G. L. (2000). Nuclear Safety: Concerns With the
    Continuing Operation of Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Reactors. Report
    to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee on
    Appropriations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.: United
    States General Accounting Office, 80.

    7. Strategic Information and Nuclear Reactors in Selected Countries
    (Algeria-Germany).Global Research Nuclear Reactors Handbook. (2011).
    Washington, D.C.: International Business Publication, 49.

    8. Technology & Soviet Energy Availability. (1979). Congress of the
    United States: Technology Assessment. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
    Government Printing Office, 116.

    9. Strategic Information and Nuclear Reactors in Selected Countries
    (Algeria-Germany). Global Research Nuclear Reactors Handbook. (2011).
    Washington, D.C.: International Business Publication, 49.

    10. Sehgal, B. R. (2012). Nuclear Safety in Light Water Reactors:
    Severe Accident Phenomenology. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 283.

    11. Nuclear Containments: State-of-art Report. (2001). Lausanne,
    Switzerland: International Federation for Structural Concrete, 21.

    12. Environment in the Transition to a Market Economy: Progress in
    Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States.
    Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. (1999). Paris:
    OECD, 241.

    13. Armenia: A Country Study. Library of Congress. Federal Research
    Division. (2004). Whitefish, M.T.: Kessinger, 124.

    14. Armenian President Signals New Delay in Nuclear Plant Closure.
    Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. (7 December 2011).

    http://www.rferl.org/content/armenia_president_signals_new_delay_in_nuclear_pla nt_closure/24414196.html

    15. Daly, John C.K. (03 Oct. 2011). Armenia's Aging Metsamor Nuclear
    Power Plant Alarms Caucasian Neighbors. Oil Prices & Energy News:
    Crude Oil Price Charts, Investment Advice.
    http://oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Nuclear-Power/Armenias-Aging-Metsamor-Nuclear-Power-Plant-Alarms-Caucasian-Neighbors.html

    16. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. Motion for a Resolution.
    Doc. 12580 [Metsamor nuclear power station - a vital threat to Europe
    in the present and the future]. (April 2011)

    http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc11/EDOC12580.htm

    17. Grigoryan, M. (4 May 2011). Armenia: Metsamor Awaits IAEA
    Inspection. Central Eurasia Project of the Open Society Institute.
    http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63418

    18. Danielyan, E. (25 July 2011). Armenia Passes International Nuclear
    Safety Test. Jamestown Foundation.

    http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38223

    19. The European Commission (15 May 2012). European Neighborhood
    Policy Package: Country Progress Report - Armenia. Press Release
    MEMO/12/330. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/12/330&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en

    20. Grigoryan M. & Hayrapetyan A. (June 2011). Armenia: Fight Brews
    Over IAEA's Thumbs-Up Appraisal of Metsamor. Central Eurasia Project
    of the Open Society Institute. http://dev.eurasianet.org/node/63638

    21. Ulrich P. (February 2012). Russia Ready to Increase Investments
    for Armenian Nuclear Power Plant Construction. Partnership for Global
    Security. http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/Projects%20and%20Publications/News/Nuclear%20News/29201293322AM.html#4E

    *Rafiga Gurbanzade is a student at the Department of Criminology Law
    and Society, University of California Irvine. She is also a member of
    the Pax Turcica Institute.

    Friday, 24 August 2012
    Journal of Turkish Weekly

    http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/140825/metsamor-the-fukushima-of-the-caucasus.html

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