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Ankara: Syria Matters

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  • Ankara: Syria Matters

    SYRIA MATTERS
    by Robert Olson

    Today's Zaman
    Oct 31 2012
    Turkey

    Two presidential debates, especially the last one on October 22 dealing
    with foreign policy, stressed strongly that Syria matters. And not
    just to Americans, but to Russia, China, Iran, Muslims and especially
    to the peoples of the Middle East.

    Syria matters because developments there over the past 20 months
    indicate that much is at stake for all of the peoples and countries
    mentioned above.

    Syria matters to Russia and China and Iran. It matters to Russia
    because Moscow wants to end the hegemonic role that the US has played
    in region for the past 12 years, especially in Iran and Afghanistan.

    It wants to emphasize that the era of unilateralism that the US has
    exercised in the region since the end of World War II is over. Russia
    also wants to assert more strongly its position in the eastern
    Mediterranean and the role it seeks to play with regard to the large
    deposits of oil and natural gas discovered in the economic zones of
    Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Egypt. The major base that it has
    to pursue these goals is in Tartus, Syria. It will pursue this policy
    regardless of who rules Syria.

    Syria also matters to China. China is the main supplier of arms and
    weapon systems to Iran and a major trading partner. Beijing, which,
    like Moscow, wants to assert that it too has a big geopolitical stake,
    is demonstrating that America's unilateral epoch in the Middle East
    has passed. China has large and growing investments and trade with
    East African countries to which it wants unhindered access -- for
    which the Arab countries are vital. Iran's interests in Syria and in
    Lebanon have been clear to anyone listening to the political debates
    during the past year. Syria is vital for Iran to be able to project
    its geopolitical posture into the Eastern Mediterranean and to support
    its Hezbollah ally in Lebanon. Hezbollah, and the many Shiites who
    support it, is the strongest political power in Lebanon and a strong
    opponent of Israel's expansionist policies both in Lebanon as well
    as in the West Bank and Gaza and a strong supporter of Palestinian
    claims against Israel. Syria has played a crucial role in Iran's
    affairs since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran when the Islamic
    leadership attempted to consolidate its legitimacy among Muslims by
    criticizing the "Zionist entity" in the eastern Mediterranean.

    But what happens in Syria matters most for the Muslim countries of the
    Middle East, especially Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. There
    are several reasons for this. When Bashar al-Assad falls, and even
    if elements of the Ba'ath regime remain, what will occur along
    political sectarian lines is of vital importance for the peoples of
    Syria. There are two worst case scenarios that should give pause to
    all policy makers involved in the conflict. One is that the remnants
    of the Assad regime will withdraw to their home base in the mountains
    along the Mediterranean stretching from southern Turkey to Lebanon and
    take their weapons, including chemical, with them as well as much of
    their air force as they are able. This would ignite a major sectarian
    war with not just the Syrian Nationalists but with the Sunni Arabs,
    including Jihadists and Salafists (zealous Muslims). If this were
    to occur, it would put many of the non-Sunnis at peril and possible
    major ethnic cleansing.

    Some 40 percent of Syria's population are minorities of one
    kind of another. The largest minorities are Christian (Greek
    Orthodox-Armenian), 12 percent; Alawite (sectarian Shiites), 12
    percent; Kurd (Sunni Muslim), 11 percent; Druze (Shiite sectarian),
    3 percent; Ismaili (Shiite sectarian), 2 percent. The remaining 60
    percent are Sunni Arabs.

    The danger to the minorities, the bulk of who have supported the
    Assad regime for the very reason they fear a predominately Sunni
    regime coming to power. When the Ba'athist, largely Alawite, regime
    came to power in 1963, it was supported by substantial numbers of
    Christians, Druze, Ismailis and Kurds, although subsequently many of
    them were purged.

    But if the reports coming from Syria over the past several months are
    correct, and they seem to be, that there is a large number of Muslim
    Brothers, Jihadists and al-Qaeda elements, most of whom come from
    the US-Gulf Arab allies, who have joined Syrian oppositional forces,
    then their support for the Assad regime and/or neutrality of many
    of the minorities is understandable and well founded. There is no
    doubt that the radicalism of the oppositional forces has grown over
    the past year. If the civil war continues, it is bound to grow more;
    let us hope that it doesn't.

    If the Christians of Syria, especially, were to experience the same
    calamities that have happened to the Christian communities in Iraq,
    which have been reduced by half (400,000 to 500,000), it would lead to
    the further decimation of Christians in the central Middle East. Since
    many of these calamities are due to the US decision to pursue a war
    of choice in Iraq, Americans are responsible for a good portion of
    these sad events.

    In this regard, Syria certainly matters for Turkey. If Turkey were to
    invade Syria and/or establish a significant buffer region in Syria,
    will it encompass much of the Kurdish regions of Syria as well as the
    Armenians in Aleppo? Many of the 800,000 to 900,000 Armenians in Syria
    were compelled to flee Turkey, many to Aleppo, after the genocide of
    their compatriots in 1915. Does Turkey want to support the oppositional
    forces in Turkey who might attempt to ethnically cleanse the region of
    Armenians, as well as other Christians, in addition to Kurds? And to
    carry out such actions just two years before the 100th anniversary of
    the Ottoman 1915 genocide of Armenians? In addition, to what extent
    would Turkey support Syrian oppositional forces against the Alawite
    population? Can or will Turkey support Syrian oppositional forces
    against the Alawites and, if so, how will it control the opposition
    to such an action among the 400,000 to 500,000 Alawite population in
    Turkey, especially in Hatay? And what of the estimated 17-18 million
    Alevis in Turkey, 15 percent of whom are Kurdish, who share cultural
    and religious sentiments with the Alawites of Syria?

    Does Ankara expect them to remain quiescent?

    An even bigger question confronting Turkey and the ruling Justice and
    Development Party (AK Party) is how much of Syria and how much of the
    Kurdish populated areas would they want to occupy? And if Turkey did
    carry out a substantial invasion of northern Syria and incorporate
    some of the Kurdish-populated areas under its military control, how
    would this affect it ability to not only resolve the Kurdish question
    in Turkey itself, but also to manage it without constant political
    unrest and war with its own Kurdish population?

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    *Robert Olson is a Middle East analyst and author of "The Ba'th and
    Syria: 1947-1982."

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