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DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COHERENT AND INCOHERENT FOREIGN POLICY
Azeri-Press news agency (APA), Azerbaijan
October 13, 2014 Monday
Political weight of Armenia's accession to the Eurasian Economic
Union and Customs Union without "NKR" will be heavier for Armenia
than it is supposed to be
Analysis. The Armenian leadership, issuing statements like "The
establishment of any customs checkpoint on the border with Nagorno
Karabakh is out of the question," "We won't abandon our interests in
NagornoKarabakh for anything", quietly agreed to the terms of joining
the Eurasian Economic Union (EEC) and Customs Union. The most important
one of these terms for Azerbaijan was Armenia's accession to this Union
without "NKR" and Yerevan's conviction to establish customs checkpoints
on the border with "NKR". These facts can be regarded as the biggest
successes of Azerbaijan's foreign policy in 2014. Armenia fell in
this situation as a result of Azerbaijan's successful foreign policy
basing on the development of bilateral relations with all countries.
Difficult economic conditions of Armenia's accession to the EEC and
Customs Union are another issue. Armenia's joining this union without
"NKR" is a political slap as Yerevan was convicted to establish customs
checkpoints on the border with "NKR". Political weight of this step
will be heavier for Yerevan than it is supposed to be. Because:
a) Armenia joined the Customs Union within its internationally
recognized borders. It means that the Union members don't recognize
NagornoKarabakh as part of Armenia once more.
b) Members of the Customs Union are the allies of Armenia within the
Collective Security Treaty Organization. The Union hit one of the cards
used in Armenia's propaganda with de facto and de jure rejection of
Armenia's claims over NagornoKarabakh. Armenia always uses a simplistic
propaganda thesis that "If Azerbaijan starts military operations
in NagornoKarabakh, CSTO will help us to eliminate threats to our
security". However, the terms of Armenia's accession to the Customs
Union undermines this thesis. If "NKR" isn't recognized as Armenia's
territory, Yerevan is demanded to establish customs checkpoints on the
border with "NKR", what threat can the start of military operations in
NagornoKarabak, the internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan,
pose to Armenia's security? Trying to prove the opposite, Armenia
will have to admit that it is an occupying country.
c) If checkpoints are established between Armenia and "NKR", Moscow
will have extra pressure on Yerevan. In other words, for some time the
Kremlin will turn a blind eye to commercial and financial transactions
of Armenia with the socalled "NKR" and if Yerevan exceeds its limit,
Russia can raise the question of control over the activities of
the checkpoints.
This dire political situation of Armenia isn't groundless, so this
situation has emerged as a result of two factors of foreign policy.
These factors have formed as a result of Armenia being deprived of
pursuing an independent foreign policy and Azerbaijan's COHERENT
foreign policy. Armenia's accession to the Customs Union without the
"Nagorno Karabakh Republic" and the condition that led to the actual
abandonment of the claims of "NKR" are the results of official Baku's
policy with Kazakhstan, Belarus and Russia based on mutual interests.
Azerbaijan has already managed to turn the tide in its favor by
developing the bilateral relations with the member states of the
Customs Union.
Today's conditions in the name of the Customs Union dictate one issue
this union is an integration project regardless of its ultimate goal.
Kazakhstan and Belarus, gave up a part of their own interest for the
sake of common interests, are interested in a successful implementation
of the project. Therefore, a factor of disintegration can jeopardize
the future fate of the Customs Union (as well as the reputation of
the initiators of the union in the international community and in the
former Soviet Union). In addition, the Customs Union, unlike other
military and political blocs, is a practical union and any failure
in its activity will deal a heavy blow to the member states not only
in the political but in the economic point of view.
Therefore, Kazakhstan and Belarus always stress the importance of
eliminating the disintegration factors that can disrupt the functioning
mechanism of the Customs Union. Armenia has always been considered
a factor of disintegration in the former Soviet Union. And the only
reason that CIS, CSTO and other integration organizations haven't
given the desired results is that Armenia does not comply with these
formats and despite the fact, it takes place in these formats as a
satellite or outpost "state".
Armenia's accession to the Customs Union is just the tip of the
iceberg, which includes the factors of rapid rise, deterioration of
living standards and acceleration of migration. There is no doubt
that these factors will disrupt the fragile stability in Armenia. All
conditions are paving the way for Armenia's opposition to hold mass
protests regularly. Increase in the price of more than 1000 consumer
products since January 1 can cause more terrible effect than the
Spitak earthquake.
The processes happening over Armenia's accession to the Customs Union
are of importance in terms of studying and applying political theory.
Despite all of these processes, balancing interests and even at the
expense of compromise, we can see how an independence and consistent
foreign policy will lead to success in the face of Azerbaijan or
theorists, analyzing recent processes, can see how Incoherent and
NonIndependent policy will lead to loss of independence in the face
of Armenia.
Azeri-Press news agency (APA), Azerbaijan
October 13, 2014 Monday
Political weight of Armenia's accession to the Eurasian Economic
Union and Customs Union without "NKR" will be heavier for Armenia
than it is supposed to be
Analysis. The Armenian leadership, issuing statements like "The
establishment of any customs checkpoint on the border with Nagorno
Karabakh is out of the question," "We won't abandon our interests in
NagornoKarabakh for anything", quietly agreed to the terms of joining
the Eurasian Economic Union (EEC) and Customs Union. The most important
one of these terms for Azerbaijan was Armenia's accession to this Union
without "NKR" and Yerevan's conviction to establish customs checkpoints
on the border with "NKR". These facts can be regarded as the biggest
successes of Azerbaijan's foreign policy in 2014. Armenia fell in
this situation as a result of Azerbaijan's successful foreign policy
basing on the development of bilateral relations with all countries.
Difficult economic conditions of Armenia's accession to the EEC and
Customs Union are another issue. Armenia's joining this union without
"NKR" is a political slap as Yerevan was convicted to establish customs
checkpoints on the border with "NKR". Political weight of this step
will be heavier for Yerevan than it is supposed to be. Because:
a) Armenia joined the Customs Union within its internationally
recognized borders. It means that the Union members don't recognize
NagornoKarabakh as part of Armenia once more.
b) Members of the Customs Union are the allies of Armenia within the
Collective Security Treaty Organization. The Union hit one of the cards
used in Armenia's propaganda with de facto and de jure rejection of
Armenia's claims over NagornoKarabakh. Armenia always uses a simplistic
propaganda thesis that "If Azerbaijan starts military operations
in NagornoKarabakh, CSTO will help us to eliminate threats to our
security". However, the terms of Armenia's accession to the Customs
Union undermines this thesis. If "NKR" isn't recognized as Armenia's
territory, Yerevan is demanded to establish customs checkpoints on the
border with "NKR", what threat can the start of military operations in
NagornoKarabak, the internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan,
pose to Armenia's security? Trying to prove the opposite, Armenia
will have to admit that it is an occupying country.
c) If checkpoints are established between Armenia and "NKR", Moscow
will have extra pressure on Yerevan. In other words, for some time the
Kremlin will turn a blind eye to commercial and financial transactions
of Armenia with the socalled "NKR" and if Yerevan exceeds its limit,
Russia can raise the question of control over the activities of
the checkpoints.
This dire political situation of Armenia isn't groundless, so this
situation has emerged as a result of two factors of foreign policy.
These factors have formed as a result of Armenia being deprived of
pursuing an independent foreign policy and Azerbaijan's COHERENT
foreign policy. Armenia's accession to the Customs Union without the
"Nagorno Karabakh Republic" and the condition that led to the actual
abandonment of the claims of "NKR" are the results of official Baku's
policy with Kazakhstan, Belarus and Russia based on mutual interests.
Azerbaijan has already managed to turn the tide in its favor by
developing the bilateral relations with the member states of the
Customs Union.
Today's conditions in the name of the Customs Union dictate one issue
this union is an integration project regardless of its ultimate goal.
Kazakhstan and Belarus, gave up a part of their own interest for the
sake of common interests, are interested in a successful implementation
of the project. Therefore, a factor of disintegration can jeopardize
the future fate of the Customs Union (as well as the reputation of
the initiators of the union in the international community and in the
former Soviet Union). In addition, the Customs Union, unlike other
military and political blocs, is a practical union and any failure
in its activity will deal a heavy blow to the member states not only
in the political but in the economic point of view.
Therefore, Kazakhstan and Belarus always stress the importance of
eliminating the disintegration factors that can disrupt the functioning
mechanism of the Customs Union. Armenia has always been considered
a factor of disintegration in the former Soviet Union. And the only
reason that CIS, CSTO and other integration organizations haven't
given the desired results is that Armenia does not comply with these
formats and despite the fact, it takes place in these formats as a
satellite or outpost "state".
Armenia's accession to the Customs Union is just the tip of the
iceberg, which includes the factors of rapid rise, deterioration of
living standards and acceleration of migration. There is no doubt
that these factors will disrupt the fragile stability in Armenia. All
conditions are paving the way for Armenia's opposition to hold mass
protests regularly. Increase in the price of more than 1000 consumer
products since January 1 can cause more terrible effect than the
Spitak earthquake.
The processes happening over Armenia's accession to the Customs Union
are of importance in terms of studying and applying political theory.
Despite all of these processes, balancing interests and even at the
expense of compromise, we can see how an independence and consistent
foreign policy will lead to success in the face of Azerbaijan or
theorists, analyzing recent processes, can see how Incoherent and
NonIndependent policy will lead to loss of independence in the face
of Armenia.