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THE MAJOR LIMITS OF TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY
By Dr.Kerem Oktem
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellit e?c=Article_C&cid=1264249956754&pagename=Z one-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout
Islam Online
Feb 10 2010
As was the case with the Kissinger's foreign policy, ethical values
are not part of Turkey's strategic-depth doctrine. (Reuters Photo)
In the last two policy briefs, I have discussed Turkey's changing
relations with the Middle East, the Muslim world, and Israel, as
well as its interaction with the Caucasus republics and the Russian
Federation.
In this concluding analysis, I will discuss the possible conflicts,
which may emerge between the principles of Turkey's Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutoglu's "strategic-depth" doctrine and realpolitik
developments on the ground.
Firstly, though, a brief consideration of the "strategic-depth"
doctrine, its origins, principles, and its location within the
tradition of the Turkish foreign policy is appropriate.
- Read the introduction of this three-article series on Turkey's
foreign policy.
1- Turkey's Foreign Policy in the Middle East
2- Turkey's Relations with Caucasus and Russia
Originally, and before its association with the US Foreign Minister
Henry Kissinger, "strategic depth" was a military term used to signify
the distance between the front line and the war-faring nations' most
vulnerable economic centers, capital, and other important cities,
as well as military industrial complexes.
The longer the distance, the safer these centers were. However,
supplies to the front would take longer and diminish the army's
ability to stock up fast and act flexibly.
Such a strategic depth could be deepened by creating clients and
collaborators behind the front line. In a metaphorical sense, this is
also what more contemporary protagonists of the concept have sought
to do.
During the Kissinger era, through much of the Cold War, strategic
depth has been described as consisting of three principles: Embracing
moderate regimes outside the sphere of the Soviet influence (mostly
dictatorships and semi-democracies), maintaining access to natural
resources, and using indirect force through proxy regimes to maintain
stability.
Emphatic observers have expressed their appreciation of Ahmet
Davutoglu's unusually proactive and multi-dimensional foreign policy
by likening him to Henry Kissinger.
They seem to have forgotten, however, that Kissinger was also one of
the key actors in the ill-advised Vietnam War which tarnished the US
reputation worldwide.
Indeed, both historically and conceptually, war remains an inherent
option in "strategic depth", and in Turkey's volatile eastern
neighbourhood, the threat of war and nuclear proliferation is not
just a hypothetical mind experiment.
Furthermore, the challenges to the current Turkish foreign policy
re-adjustment are not limited to the eastern front, but also come
from Turkey's domestic conflicts and deteriorating relations with
the European Union.
Challenge 1: Conflict Between Eastern Neighbours
The cautious opening toward Armenia has resulted in a significant
toning down of relations with the formerly close ethnic "brother"
nation of Azerbaijan.
In the conflict between Georgia and Russia, the Turkish government
has been able to maintain good relations with two warring countries;
in the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan, this has not been possible.
The cautious opening toward Armenia has resulted in a significant
toning down of relations with the formerly close ethnic "brother"
nation of Azerbaijan.
The warming of relations with Syria has been accompanied by a
remarkable deterioration in Turkey's partnership with Israel.
Other potential conflicts loom large: The Turkish Foreign Minister
may play a role as mediator between Iran and Iraq. Yet, the seizure
of the Iraqi Al-Fakkah Oil Field by Iranian troops may turn into an
armed conflict, which would force Turkey to make a choice between
Iraq and the Western allies on the one side, and Iran on the other.
Considering that Iran's embattled President Mahmud Ahmadinajadi might
consider pushing hostilities with Iraq to diffuse tensions at home
and save his seat, this choice might be more imminent than many expect.
A comparably tricky decision will arise, if the UN Security Council
decides on the rein-forcement of sanctions or military actions against
Iran. As a temporary member of the council affirmed that Turkey will
have to decide on which side it stands.
The question, therefore, is justified about whether much of the current
multi-dimensional "opening" might in fact not turn out to be a new
type of zero-sum game, where intensified relations with the Arab
and Muslim elements weaken Turkey's Western orientation, and where
renewed conflict within the Middle East will make a "zero-conflict"
policy with all neighbours impossible.
Challenge 2: Domestic Insecurity Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan has shown signs of developing autocratic reflexes.
Turkey's foreign policy strength is vulnerable, above all, due to
the volatility of the Turkish domestic political scene.
True, there is no denying the fact that Turkey has been undergoing
momentous changes, from the power struggle between the government and
the military, and the latter's gradual recession from power to the
AKP government's efforts to bring a fresh perspective to ossified
problems such as the disenfranchisement of Turkey's Kurdish and
non-Muslim citizens.
The Ergenekon investigation, carried out by the judiciary, but
supported by the government--sometimes a bit too openly--has been
revealing shocking details of plans for coup d'états and psychological
warfare.
For many citizens of Turkey, it was hard to swallow that the
once-revered army has been involved in assassination plans against
members of religious and ethnic minorities and politicians. However,
these changes have also unsettled large segments of the Turkish
society and alienated important parts of the electorate from the AKP.
Above all, the transformation from tutelage democracy--a result of the
military coup of 1980 and the Kemalist nationalism to a post-Kemalist
liberal democracy has not been handled well by the government.
Turkey's attraction to its eastern neighbours owes much to its status
as future member of the European Union. (Reuters Photo)
It has fuelled fears of the secular middle classes, the left wing and
the Alevis (a heterodox religious community with a distant reference
to Shiite traditions) that the government is using the democratizing
reforms to turn Turkey into a Shari'ah-based regime. The government
has done little to pacify these fears.
Finally, Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, severely
attacked by the coalition of the army, the bureaucracy, and the
judiciary, has shown signs of developing autocratic reflexes.
Independent human rights associations have testified that maltreatment
and torture in police custody has been on the rise for at least three
consecutive years, and so has the number of members of the public
shot by police.
Extremely heavy policing at anti-government and trade union
demonstrations have fuelled unrest and polarized society. Unlike
in 2002 and 2007, when the AKP was supported by a broad coalition of
liberals, intellectuals, and members of the general public, the party's
electoral support is waning. This notwithstanding, the AKP remains
the largest political party with no serious constructive opposition.
The course of domestic politics reveals that a possible loss of
electoral support and espe-cially the uncertain future of Turkey's
Kurds will make Turkey's standing in the world more complex and
contested, not less.
Challenge 3: Strained Relations with the European Union The lack of a
comprehensive solution in Cyprus has put Turkey on a collision course
with the European Union.
The final impediment to the full realization of "strategic depth",
and probably the most important, stems from the deadlock, which is
building up with the European Union. Ever since accession negotiations
finally began in 2005, relations have been deteriorating.
This was in part due to "enlargement fatigue" in the European Union
and the anti-Turkish rhetoric of President Nicholas Sarkozy and German
Chancellor Angelo Merkel, and in part because of the very slow reform
process in Turkey.
More importantly, many EU-induced legal reforms were eventually scaled
back or re-tracted, as was the case with the draconian Police Law
and the Anti-Terror Law, which were enacted by the government in 2007.
If these structural impediments were not bad enough, the lack of a
comprehensive solution in Cyprus has put Turkey on a collision course
with the European Union, whose outcome is hard to predict. What could
be said with a deal of certainty, however, is that Turkey's attraction
to its eastern neighbours owes much to its status as future member
of the European Union.
Without this perspective in place, and without the normative framework
for a legal and democratic reform, Turkey will lose power also in
its eastern neighbourhood.
Conclusion Is it possible to conduct a foreign policy based on soft
power and win-win conceptions in an environment that is governed by
the rules of zero-sum games?
All that glisters is not gold, and all that enthuses may not be
permanent. The AKP governments since 2002, and the Turkish Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu have succeeded in making Turkish foreign
policy a more proactive and more dynamic.
Where Turkey used to be reactive, US-oriented, and inward-looking,
it has become proactive, multidimensional and global. Where it was a
feeble economic actor, it has now become a powerhouse of industrial
production, construction, and services. Turkey is now the world's
15th largest economy, and one of the few non-rentier economies in
the Middle East.
Bilateral trade, economic policy, and culture and charismatic
leadership have become part of Turkey's foreign policy outlook. In
parallel to the country's growing export-oriented industrial sector,
expanding middle classes, and the rising global role of Turkish
Muslim educational networks, such as the Gulen movement, Turkish
foreign policy has indeed become "deeper".
However, it has also become more vulnerable. I have discussed
many tensions and domestic and international conflicts, which the
"zero-conflict" strategy will not be able to respond to meaningfully.
Finally, as was the case with the Kissinger's foreign policy, ethical
values are not part of Turkey's strategic-depth doctrine. This is
why Turkey has been able to conduct business with Iran and Sudan,
while being woefully disinterested in the fate of the victims of the
two regimes.
Yet again, Iran might be a test too hard to pass; After the "stolen
elections" of the summer in Iran, President Ahmadinajadi has
unleashed an unprecedented reign of terror, which resulted in the
death, execution, and rape of many of his critics at the hands of
the Revolutionary Guards.
The respected Grand Ayatollah Hossain Ali Montazeri, before his death
on December 20 2009, had condemned Ahmadinajadi's terror policy in
harsh terms and called for a public mourning after the murder of Neda
Agha Soltan.
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's emphatic endorsement of Mr Ahmedinejad
came as a stub to many Millions of Iranians, who believe that the
latter is a dictator and imposter. This may yet come to haunt Turkey,
if Ahmadinejadi's grip on Iran comes to halt.
Social scientists are not very good in predicting the future, a fact
that was brought pain-fully close to home by the global financial
crisis that only very few foresaw.
They are good at asking questions, however, and this is how I would
like to conclude.
Can a country projects power convincingly if it has not yet been able
to resolve the key conflicts torturing its society, like the rights
of Kurds and other minorities, the future of secularism, the role of
the army, and the safeguarding of human rights?
Moreover, is it possible to conduct a foreign policy based on soft
power and win-win conceptions in an environment that is governed by
the rules of zero-sum games, hard power, and the disregard of popular
will? We might not need to wait too long to receive an answer.
----------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------
Kerem Oktem is a Research Associate at the European Studies Centre
in the University of Oxford and works at South East European Studies
at Oxford (SEESOX).He has concentrated on questions of conflict and
memory in Turkey, South East Europe and the Mediterranean, and the
impact of historical conflicts on inter-regional relations.
His recent publications include "Angry Nation: Turkey since 1989 "and
"Turkey's Engagement with Modernity".
By Dr.Kerem Oktem
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellit e?c=Article_C&cid=1264249956754&pagename=Z one-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout
Islam Online
Feb 10 2010
As was the case with the Kissinger's foreign policy, ethical values
are not part of Turkey's strategic-depth doctrine. (Reuters Photo)
In the last two policy briefs, I have discussed Turkey's changing
relations with the Middle East, the Muslim world, and Israel, as
well as its interaction with the Caucasus republics and the Russian
Federation.
In this concluding analysis, I will discuss the possible conflicts,
which may emerge between the principles of Turkey's Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutoglu's "strategic-depth" doctrine and realpolitik
developments on the ground.
Firstly, though, a brief consideration of the "strategic-depth"
doctrine, its origins, principles, and its location within the
tradition of the Turkish foreign policy is appropriate.
- Read the introduction of this three-article series on Turkey's
foreign policy.
1- Turkey's Foreign Policy in the Middle East
2- Turkey's Relations with Caucasus and Russia
Originally, and before its association with the US Foreign Minister
Henry Kissinger, "strategic depth" was a military term used to signify
the distance between the front line and the war-faring nations' most
vulnerable economic centers, capital, and other important cities,
as well as military industrial complexes.
The longer the distance, the safer these centers were. However,
supplies to the front would take longer and diminish the army's
ability to stock up fast and act flexibly.
Such a strategic depth could be deepened by creating clients and
collaborators behind the front line. In a metaphorical sense, this is
also what more contemporary protagonists of the concept have sought
to do.
During the Kissinger era, through much of the Cold War, strategic
depth has been described as consisting of three principles: Embracing
moderate regimes outside the sphere of the Soviet influence (mostly
dictatorships and semi-democracies), maintaining access to natural
resources, and using indirect force through proxy regimes to maintain
stability.
Emphatic observers have expressed their appreciation of Ahmet
Davutoglu's unusually proactive and multi-dimensional foreign policy
by likening him to Henry Kissinger.
They seem to have forgotten, however, that Kissinger was also one of
the key actors in the ill-advised Vietnam War which tarnished the US
reputation worldwide.
Indeed, both historically and conceptually, war remains an inherent
option in "strategic depth", and in Turkey's volatile eastern
neighbourhood, the threat of war and nuclear proliferation is not
just a hypothetical mind experiment.
Furthermore, the challenges to the current Turkish foreign policy
re-adjustment are not limited to the eastern front, but also come
from Turkey's domestic conflicts and deteriorating relations with
the European Union.
Challenge 1: Conflict Between Eastern Neighbours
The cautious opening toward Armenia has resulted in a significant
toning down of relations with the formerly close ethnic "brother"
nation of Azerbaijan.
In the conflict between Georgia and Russia, the Turkish government
has been able to maintain good relations with two warring countries;
in the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan, this has not been possible.
The cautious opening toward Armenia has resulted in a significant
toning down of relations with the formerly close ethnic "brother"
nation of Azerbaijan.
The warming of relations with Syria has been accompanied by a
remarkable deterioration in Turkey's partnership with Israel.
Other potential conflicts loom large: The Turkish Foreign Minister
may play a role as mediator between Iran and Iraq. Yet, the seizure
of the Iraqi Al-Fakkah Oil Field by Iranian troops may turn into an
armed conflict, which would force Turkey to make a choice between
Iraq and the Western allies on the one side, and Iran on the other.
Considering that Iran's embattled President Mahmud Ahmadinajadi might
consider pushing hostilities with Iraq to diffuse tensions at home
and save his seat, this choice might be more imminent than many expect.
A comparably tricky decision will arise, if the UN Security Council
decides on the rein-forcement of sanctions or military actions against
Iran. As a temporary member of the council affirmed that Turkey will
have to decide on which side it stands.
The question, therefore, is justified about whether much of the current
multi-dimensional "opening" might in fact not turn out to be a new
type of zero-sum game, where intensified relations with the Arab
and Muslim elements weaken Turkey's Western orientation, and where
renewed conflict within the Middle East will make a "zero-conflict"
policy with all neighbours impossible.
Challenge 2: Domestic Insecurity Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan has shown signs of developing autocratic reflexes.
Turkey's foreign policy strength is vulnerable, above all, due to
the volatility of the Turkish domestic political scene.
True, there is no denying the fact that Turkey has been undergoing
momentous changes, from the power struggle between the government and
the military, and the latter's gradual recession from power to the
AKP government's efforts to bring a fresh perspective to ossified
problems such as the disenfranchisement of Turkey's Kurdish and
non-Muslim citizens.
The Ergenekon investigation, carried out by the judiciary, but
supported by the government--sometimes a bit too openly--has been
revealing shocking details of plans for coup d'états and psychological
warfare.
For many citizens of Turkey, it was hard to swallow that the
once-revered army has been involved in assassination plans against
members of religious and ethnic minorities and politicians. However,
these changes have also unsettled large segments of the Turkish
society and alienated important parts of the electorate from the AKP.
Above all, the transformation from tutelage democracy--a result of the
military coup of 1980 and the Kemalist nationalism to a post-Kemalist
liberal democracy has not been handled well by the government.
Turkey's attraction to its eastern neighbours owes much to its status
as future member of the European Union. (Reuters Photo)
It has fuelled fears of the secular middle classes, the left wing and
the Alevis (a heterodox religious community with a distant reference
to Shiite traditions) that the government is using the democratizing
reforms to turn Turkey into a Shari'ah-based regime. The government
has done little to pacify these fears.
Finally, Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, severely
attacked by the coalition of the army, the bureaucracy, and the
judiciary, has shown signs of developing autocratic reflexes.
Independent human rights associations have testified that maltreatment
and torture in police custody has been on the rise for at least three
consecutive years, and so has the number of members of the public
shot by police.
Extremely heavy policing at anti-government and trade union
demonstrations have fuelled unrest and polarized society. Unlike
in 2002 and 2007, when the AKP was supported by a broad coalition of
liberals, intellectuals, and members of the general public, the party's
electoral support is waning. This notwithstanding, the AKP remains
the largest political party with no serious constructive opposition.
The course of domestic politics reveals that a possible loss of
electoral support and espe-cially the uncertain future of Turkey's
Kurds will make Turkey's standing in the world more complex and
contested, not less.
Challenge 3: Strained Relations with the European Union The lack of a
comprehensive solution in Cyprus has put Turkey on a collision course
with the European Union.
The final impediment to the full realization of "strategic depth",
and probably the most important, stems from the deadlock, which is
building up with the European Union. Ever since accession negotiations
finally began in 2005, relations have been deteriorating.
This was in part due to "enlargement fatigue" in the European Union
and the anti-Turkish rhetoric of President Nicholas Sarkozy and German
Chancellor Angelo Merkel, and in part because of the very slow reform
process in Turkey.
More importantly, many EU-induced legal reforms were eventually scaled
back or re-tracted, as was the case with the draconian Police Law
and the Anti-Terror Law, which were enacted by the government in 2007.
If these structural impediments were not bad enough, the lack of a
comprehensive solution in Cyprus has put Turkey on a collision course
with the European Union, whose outcome is hard to predict. What could
be said with a deal of certainty, however, is that Turkey's attraction
to its eastern neighbours owes much to its status as future member
of the European Union.
Without this perspective in place, and without the normative framework
for a legal and democratic reform, Turkey will lose power also in
its eastern neighbourhood.
Conclusion Is it possible to conduct a foreign policy based on soft
power and win-win conceptions in an environment that is governed by
the rules of zero-sum games?
All that glisters is not gold, and all that enthuses may not be
permanent. The AKP governments since 2002, and the Turkish Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu have succeeded in making Turkish foreign
policy a more proactive and more dynamic.
Where Turkey used to be reactive, US-oriented, and inward-looking,
it has become proactive, multidimensional and global. Where it was a
feeble economic actor, it has now become a powerhouse of industrial
production, construction, and services. Turkey is now the world's
15th largest economy, and one of the few non-rentier economies in
the Middle East.
Bilateral trade, economic policy, and culture and charismatic
leadership have become part of Turkey's foreign policy outlook. In
parallel to the country's growing export-oriented industrial sector,
expanding middle classes, and the rising global role of Turkish
Muslim educational networks, such as the Gulen movement, Turkish
foreign policy has indeed become "deeper".
However, it has also become more vulnerable. I have discussed
many tensions and domestic and international conflicts, which the
"zero-conflict" strategy will not be able to respond to meaningfully.
Finally, as was the case with the Kissinger's foreign policy, ethical
values are not part of Turkey's strategic-depth doctrine. This is
why Turkey has been able to conduct business with Iran and Sudan,
while being woefully disinterested in the fate of the victims of the
two regimes.
Yet again, Iran might be a test too hard to pass; After the "stolen
elections" of the summer in Iran, President Ahmadinajadi has
unleashed an unprecedented reign of terror, which resulted in the
death, execution, and rape of many of his critics at the hands of
the Revolutionary Guards.
The respected Grand Ayatollah Hossain Ali Montazeri, before his death
on December 20 2009, had condemned Ahmadinajadi's terror policy in
harsh terms and called for a public mourning after the murder of Neda
Agha Soltan.
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's emphatic endorsement of Mr Ahmedinejad
came as a stub to many Millions of Iranians, who believe that the
latter is a dictator and imposter. This may yet come to haunt Turkey,
if Ahmadinejadi's grip on Iran comes to halt.
Social scientists are not very good in predicting the future, a fact
that was brought pain-fully close to home by the global financial
crisis that only very few foresaw.
They are good at asking questions, however, and this is how I would
like to conclude.
Can a country projects power convincingly if it has not yet been able
to resolve the key conflicts torturing its society, like the rights
of Kurds and other minorities, the future of secularism, the role of
the army, and the safeguarding of human rights?
Moreover, is it possible to conduct a foreign policy based on soft
power and win-win conceptions in an environment that is governed by
the rules of zero-sum games, hard power, and the disregard of popular
will? We might not need to wait too long to receive an answer.
----------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------
Kerem Oktem is a Research Associate at the European Studies Centre
in the University of Oxford and works at South East European Studies
at Oxford (SEESOX).He has concentrated on questions of conflict and
memory in Turkey, South East Europe and the Mediterranean, and the
impact of historical conflicts on inter-regional relations.
His recent publications include "Angry Nation: Turkey since 1989 "and
"Turkey's Engagement with Modernity".