Tweet
AN UNAPPEALING CHOICE: RUSSIA'S DILEMMA IN KOSOVO
Comment by Vladimir Frolov
Russia Profile, Russia
Feb 6 2007
On Feb. 2, Martti Ahtisaari, the UN Special Envoy for the Future
Status of Kosovo, presented his Comprehensive Proposal for a Kosovo
Status Settlement, called for by UN Security Council Resolution 1244,
which ended the 1999 Kosovo war.
Now, almost eight years after NATO went to war to protect ethnic
Albanians there, Kosovo is about to get what it wants most -
independence, or so it seems.
Ahtasaari's plan does not specifically mention independence for
Kosovo, but it leaves little, if anything, of Serbia's sovereignty
over the territory, and it is clear that Belgrade will have no
jurisdiction over Kosovo, with the exception of some limited links
with Serbian-controlled municipalities.
Under the plan, Kosovo would have its own national symbols, including
a flag and anthem reflecting its multiethnic character. Kosovo may
seek membership in international organizations, including the UN, the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. No specific mention
of EU or NATO membership has been made for the time being. Kosovo
will not be allowed to hold referenda on joining other states,
a clear sign that Albanian irredentism will not be tolerated.
Ahtisaari's plan does not envision complete Albanian self-rule in
Kosovo. The plan establishes an Office of a Senior International
Representative who will have the authority to block decisions by
the Kosovo government and parliament. It also calls for deploying a
European Union police mission that will keep in check the lightly-armed
Kosovo multiethnic security force which could otherwise become an
all-Albanian army.
In a move that represents the most serious encroachment on Serbia's
sovereignty, the plan provides for Kosovo's control over its borders
which, together with the right to join international institutions,
opens the door for Kosovo's recognition as an independent state.
The United States called Ahtisaari's plan "fair and balanced." Other
Western participants in the Contact Group also made it clear they
would support the plan, which still needs to be endorsed by the
Security Council.
Russia, however, has made its position purposefully ambiguous -
it will not block the plan if Belgrade agrees to it, and wants to
delay the Security Council's debate over Kosovo to give Serbia time
to form a stable government.
Although Moscow says that Serbia's sovereignty should be maintained,
it makes clear that Western efforts to ensure Kosovo's independence
may not entirely be against Russia's interests, and might even be
useful for Russia as a precedent to marshal support for international
acknowledgment of the unrecognized states in the former Soviet Union -
Transdnestr, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are pro-Russian.
Moscow, however, carefully avoids mentioning Nagorno-Karabakh in
this category, given the strategic importance of Russia's relations
with Azerbaijan.
President Vladimir Putin has been the first to insist on the
universality of the Kosovo solution and its direct application to
other unrecognized states. Last week in Davos, Switzerland, his likely
successor as Russia's president, Dmitry Medvedev, insisted that the
way Kosovo's status is resolved should have direct applicability to
other similar cases.
But what in practice does Russia mean? Will it go ahead and recognize
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestr the moment Kosovo achieves
independence?
The United States and the EU make it clear they do not see any
parallels between Kosovo and the frozen conflicts in the former Soviet
Union, although this position is questionable.
The parallels between Kosovo and the other frozen conflicts are
obvious - the feud is between ethnically distinct communities living
in localized enclaves, blood has been spilled, separation between the
groups was achieved through measures bordering on ethnic cleansing,
ethnically based governments, complete with constitutions and armies,
have been created, elections and pro-independence referenda held,
and reintegration into the states that surround them appears to be
all but impossible.
The only thing that distinguishes Kosovo from Abkhazia, South Ossetia
and Transdnestr is that it received its current status as a result
of NATO's war against Yugoslavia in 1999 and the Security Council
Resolution 1244.
However, it is very unlikely that the West will ever agree that Kosovo
is a precedent, and Moscow will have to deal with this reality.
Russia's hypothetical recognition of the unrecognized states in the
former Soviet Union is fraught with serious problems. Apart from the
increased tensions with the United States and the EU that would most
certainly come from such a decision, Russia would have to deal with
the further unraveling of the CIS and a renewed push by Georgia and
Moldova for NATO membership. Then there is the question of subsidizing
those states economically, which is bearable, but not really pleasant.
And, of course, there is the question of irredentism - all of
these states have announced their desire to join Russia, which is
geographically feasible in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
but untenable in the case of Transdnestr. Allowing them to join Russia
would generate accusations of aggression and land grabbing.
Russia could face international sanctions, and the costs of enlarging
its territory could be very high.
Kosovo presents a no-win situation for Russia. Accepting a plan
for independence and claiming it to be a precedent makes Georgia a
victim of aggression with consequent admission into NATO. (In the
case of Moldova, however, Ahtisaari's plan resembles in many respects
Dmitry Kozak's plan for Transdnestr and could really be a platform
for conflict resolution).
By objecting to Kosovo's independence, however, Russia would put an
end to the aspirations of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestr which
could be portrayed domestically as Russia's betrayal of its countrymen.
That's why many people in the Russian leadership would love to delay
the final status resolution for Kosovo indefinitely and maintain
the ambiguity in the terms of the other frozen conflicts. The only
problem with this approach is that it is unsustainable in the long
run. Ahtisaari's plan is forcing Russia to make a choice.
Comment by Vladimir Frolov
Russia Profile, Russia
Feb 6 2007
On Feb. 2, Martti Ahtisaari, the UN Special Envoy for the Future
Status of Kosovo, presented his Comprehensive Proposal for a Kosovo
Status Settlement, called for by UN Security Council Resolution 1244,
which ended the 1999 Kosovo war.
Now, almost eight years after NATO went to war to protect ethnic
Albanians there, Kosovo is about to get what it wants most -
independence, or so it seems.
Ahtasaari's plan does not specifically mention independence for
Kosovo, but it leaves little, if anything, of Serbia's sovereignty
over the territory, and it is clear that Belgrade will have no
jurisdiction over Kosovo, with the exception of some limited links
with Serbian-controlled municipalities.
Under the plan, Kosovo would have its own national symbols, including
a flag and anthem reflecting its multiethnic character. Kosovo may
seek membership in international organizations, including the UN, the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. No specific mention
of EU or NATO membership has been made for the time being. Kosovo
will not be allowed to hold referenda on joining other states,
a clear sign that Albanian irredentism will not be tolerated.
Ahtisaari's plan does not envision complete Albanian self-rule in
Kosovo. The plan establishes an Office of a Senior International
Representative who will have the authority to block decisions by
the Kosovo government and parliament. It also calls for deploying a
European Union police mission that will keep in check the lightly-armed
Kosovo multiethnic security force which could otherwise become an
all-Albanian army.
In a move that represents the most serious encroachment on Serbia's
sovereignty, the plan provides for Kosovo's control over its borders
which, together with the right to join international institutions,
opens the door for Kosovo's recognition as an independent state.
The United States called Ahtisaari's plan "fair and balanced." Other
Western participants in the Contact Group also made it clear they
would support the plan, which still needs to be endorsed by the
Security Council.
Russia, however, has made its position purposefully ambiguous -
it will not block the plan if Belgrade agrees to it, and wants to
delay the Security Council's debate over Kosovo to give Serbia time
to form a stable government.
Although Moscow says that Serbia's sovereignty should be maintained,
it makes clear that Western efforts to ensure Kosovo's independence
may not entirely be against Russia's interests, and might even be
useful for Russia as a precedent to marshal support for international
acknowledgment of the unrecognized states in the former Soviet Union -
Transdnestr, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are pro-Russian.
Moscow, however, carefully avoids mentioning Nagorno-Karabakh in
this category, given the strategic importance of Russia's relations
with Azerbaijan.
President Vladimir Putin has been the first to insist on the
universality of the Kosovo solution and its direct application to
other unrecognized states. Last week in Davos, Switzerland, his likely
successor as Russia's president, Dmitry Medvedev, insisted that the
way Kosovo's status is resolved should have direct applicability to
other similar cases.
But what in practice does Russia mean? Will it go ahead and recognize
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestr the moment Kosovo achieves
independence?
The United States and the EU make it clear they do not see any
parallels between Kosovo and the frozen conflicts in the former Soviet
Union, although this position is questionable.
The parallels between Kosovo and the other frozen conflicts are
obvious - the feud is between ethnically distinct communities living
in localized enclaves, blood has been spilled, separation between the
groups was achieved through measures bordering on ethnic cleansing,
ethnically based governments, complete with constitutions and armies,
have been created, elections and pro-independence referenda held,
and reintegration into the states that surround them appears to be
all but impossible.
The only thing that distinguishes Kosovo from Abkhazia, South Ossetia
and Transdnestr is that it received its current status as a result
of NATO's war against Yugoslavia in 1999 and the Security Council
Resolution 1244.
However, it is very unlikely that the West will ever agree that Kosovo
is a precedent, and Moscow will have to deal with this reality.
Russia's hypothetical recognition of the unrecognized states in the
former Soviet Union is fraught with serious problems. Apart from the
increased tensions with the United States and the EU that would most
certainly come from such a decision, Russia would have to deal with
the further unraveling of the CIS and a renewed push by Georgia and
Moldova for NATO membership. Then there is the question of subsidizing
those states economically, which is bearable, but not really pleasant.
And, of course, there is the question of irredentism - all of
these states have announced their desire to join Russia, which is
geographically feasible in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
but untenable in the case of Transdnestr. Allowing them to join Russia
would generate accusations of aggression and land grabbing.
Russia could face international sanctions, and the costs of enlarging
its territory could be very high.
Kosovo presents a no-win situation for Russia. Accepting a plan
for independence and claiming it to be a precedent makes Georgia a
victim of aggression with consequent admission into NATO. (In the
case of Moldova, however, Ahtisaari's plan resembles in many respects
Dmitry Kozak's plan for Transdnestr and could really be a platform
for conflict resolution).
By objecting to Kosovo's independence, however, Russia would put an
end to the aspirations of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestr which
could be portrayed domestically as Russia's betrayal of its countrymen.
That's why many people in the Russian leadership would love to delay
the final status resolution for Kosovo indefinitely and maintain
the ambiguity in the terms of the other frozen conflicts. The only
problem with this approach is that it is unsustainable in the long
run. Ahtisaari's plan is forcing Russia to make a choice.