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RUSSIAN AND MUSLIM HISTORY
Assyrian International News Agency
Nov 13 2007
By the time of Putin's presidency, the Russian state had consolidated
its position and new ideology; and thus a new construction of Russian
history was shaped following the usual pattern, where the new present
usually leads to the creation of a new past.
This new ideology, at least on a semi-official level, is a construction
that could be compared with that of the ideological construction of
late Imperial Russia. Still, it has its own specific nature. While
for most of the Westernized elite of the last years of Romanov rule
Russia was a part of the European order, indicated above all by
Russia's alliance with France and England, the present-day Russian
Westernized elite is not sure about this. Not just the USA but even
Europe, for all of their attractiveness, are seen by some segments of
the Russian middle class as alien or even hostile entities, despite
all of the friendly gestures of Russians to fellow Europeans.
In this cautious vision of the West, Russian official ideology could
well be seen in the context of the Slavophilism of the 19th century.
However, contrary to the 19th century Slavophiles, present-day Russians
ideologists see no friends among "brother" Slavs, as testified by
the recent brush with pro-Russian Slavic Belorussians.
Still, despite the differences, elements of the ideology of the late
imperial and late Stalin periods could easily be perceived in the
ideological construction of the regime and, consequently, in its
vision of the past. In this picture, Russia has always been a great
nation, a mighty state, that protects/dominates numerous minorities,
including those that historically professed Islam, who lived happily
in the shadow of the broad wings of the Russian eagle.
This historical construction is increasingly challenged by Muslim
intellectuals who have constructed their own vision of the present
and the past, one which resonates among the Muslim masses. They, for
a variety of reasons, are increasingly disinclined to be fused in the
Russian melting pot. One of the major reasons why ethnic minorities
and newcomers - and local Russians - do not usually see much difference
between bona fide citizens of the Federation and foreign nationals who
are not fused with ethnic Russians - is the endless harassment. Even
those members who had not only lived in Russia but also in Moscow
for generations have found themselves in trouble.
While deciding to have my shoes polished during one of my recent
trips to Moscow, I encountered an Assyrian, a member of one of the
small and little-known ethnic groups in Russia. The Russian Assyrians
have historically been engaged in shoe polishing and repair for
generations. A portly Assyrian woman complained to me that life
for her and the entire Assyrian community became uneasy after the
collapse of the USSR. Some of her complaints actually indicated that
the Russian melting pot is still able to absorb some isolated groups of
minorities. She said that Assyrians in Moscow were isolated. She said
that their priest came from Iraq, but that local Assyrians could not
understand him. And she ended her litany with a gloomy statement to the
effect that God had punished them for the brutality of the past. The
isolation of the small Assyrian community seems to be leading to the
natural process of slow assimilation. She said that while she knew
the language, her children and grandchildren were assimilating.
Although the Russian melting pot seems to be working, at least
in the case of the small and isolated Assyrian community, it has
still been unable completely to absorb the Assyrians and other small
minorities, even when they become thoroughly Russified both culturally
and linguistically. The reason for this is the endless harassment by
ethnic Russians. Increasingly, even those ethnic minorities who speak
Russian as their own language find it hard to avoid the notion that it
is blood/race that really counts. The sense of alienation from ethnic
Russians reinforces this mood among the various ethnic groups.They
often have no sense of solidarity and frequently regard one another
with suspicion. My Assyrian interlocutor complained that before the
collapse of the USSR everyone was treated well; but now, she says,
she is taken for Armenian, and harassed. She complains that she is
a grassroots Muscovite and, thus, not just by law but even more by
a sort of informal tradition, has a right to live in Moscow and not
be treated as a newcomer from the Caucasus.
If even the natives and Russian-speaking minorities with no accent
could be harassed, this was even more the case with those people
who came from the ethnic enclaves of the Russian Federation, or what
Russians call the "near abroad", with their limited linguistic skills
and clear differences from Russians in habits and culture. One
of my Moscow market acquaintances of Turkic origin complained
that Russians did not like them and accused them of all kinds of
crimes. In some cases, the harassment turned to actual violence. A
student from India whom I met in Ekaterinburg told me that he "loved"
Russian culture: but he was beaten severely by skinheads and spent
some time in hospital. He was also assaulted in Moscow, and he knew
of several similar cases. The alienation from ethnic Russians is a
powerful incentive for minorities, including those who profess Islam,
to create their own alternative vision of history as the ideological
framework for their conflict with Russians.
Alternative vision of history
The challenge to semi-official and official Russian history came about
in a variety of ways. One of these interpretations, while implying that
Muslims and Orthodox Russian, indeed, lived together for centuries,
stressed that Muslims were not second fiddle. On the contrary,
they played a crucial role in the creation of Russian/Eurasian
civilizations. This reshaping of the past started with a reevaluation
of the beginning of Russian history. In this interpretation, Russian
history did not begin in Orthodox Kievan Russia but actually in Turkic
Muslim Volga Bulgaria, with the ancestors of the Tatar people. It
was the Bulgarians who faced the first onslaught of Mongols and thus
reduced their destruction of the Slavic land on the West and Europe
in general.
At the same time, in another interpretation - and, here, the Mongols
re-emerge as a positive force - it was the Mongols/Tatars who
destroyed the forces of the West that aimed to conquer Russia. It
was the Mongols/Tatars who played the crucial role in defeating the
"dog knights" in the Battle of Ice in 1242. The Golden Horde, the
Tatar-Mongol empire that ruled over Russia for more than 200 years,
was the umbrella that made it possible for Russia to flourish.
These ideologists harken back to the Eurasianist paradigm. Still,
in this interpretation, there are certain unique elements. In this
interpretation, the Tatars/Mongols, of course, actually became a
civilizing and peculiarly europeanizing force. In fact, according to
this paradigm, in future years both Bulgarians and Tatars/Mongols
spread education, industry and tolerance, regardless of creed and
ethnicity. The Tatars emerge here as Europeans on the outskirts
of Europe, shedding a civilizing light on the backward, brutish,
intolerant and - actually - Asiatic Russians who in their political
culture manifested the worst elements of "Asiatism." The Tatars and
other Muslim peoples played a continuously crucial role in protecting
Russia in upheavals and wars from the 17th century to the present day.
Another paradigm implies a different vision of Orthodox Russian/Muslim
relations. This theory discards the notion of peaceful cooperation
between them and emphasizes the Russians' domination. In this paradigm,
the benign nature of Russia's actions was totally discarded. Instead
of vicious Asiatics who fell upon the peaceful Russians, a popular
theme among some nationalistic writers for a long time, it was the
vicious Russians who fell upon the peaceful Muslims.
This story began with Russia's conquest of Kazan in 1552, evolved
with the conquest of Siberia, and reached its climax in the 18th-19th
centuries with the genocidal conquest of the Caucasus, where the
Muslims were massacred en masse. The brutal tactics of the Soviet
regime in this respect were simply a continuation of centuries-old
tradition. The question is, of course, to what degree this intellectual
construction penetrated the minds of the Russian minority masses. One
can assume, at least from the anecdotal evidence, that this did indeed
take place.
Conclusion
What is the practical implication of these different visions of
the past and the present? It clearly indicates that deep problems
exist: the conflict between Russians and the state's various ethnic
minorities. It might well be argued that these problems could be
ignored or marginalized, for they have always existed. Still, there
is reason for concern. First, these conflicts/tensions could safely be
ignored only if the state were to maintain its absolute authority and
no crisis lay ahead. Secondly, even if the state maintained its grip
over society and dealt quickly with occasional revolts, as in Kondopoga
and Stavropol, the demographics - the increase of the proportion of
minorities in the Russian population - could well lead to problems
in the future, regardless of the viability of Russia. And for this
reason the images of the past and, consequently, of the present,
might be seen in hindsight as a sign of things to come.
By Dr. Dmitry Shlapentokh www.watchdog.cz
Dr. Dmitry Shlapentokh is Associate Professor of History at Indiana
University South Bend, USA, and a regular contributor to Prague
Watchdog.
Assyrian International News Agency
Nov 13 2007
By the time of Putin's presidency, the Russian state had consolidated
its position and new ideology; and thus a new construction of Russian
history was shaped following the usual pattern, where the new present
usually leads to the creation of a new past.
This new ideology, at least on a semi-official level, is a construction
that could be compared with that of the ideological construction of
late Imperial Russia. Still, it has its own specific nature. While
for most of the Westernized elite of the last years of Romanov rule
Russia was a part of the European order, indicated above all by
Russia's alliance with France and England, the present-day Russian
Westernized elite is not sure about this. Not just the USA but even
Europe, for all of their attractiveness, are seen by some segments of
the Russian middle class as alien or even hostile entities, despite
all of the friendly gestures of Russians to fellow Europeans.
In this cautious vision of the West, Russian official ideology could
well be seen in the context of the Slavophilism of the 19th century.
However, contrary to the 19th century Slavophiles, present-day Russians
ideologists see no friends among "brother" Slavs, as testified by
the recent brush with pro-Russian Slavic Belorussians.
Still, despite the differences, elements of the ideology of the late
imperial and late Stalin periods could easily be perceived in the
ideological construction of the regime and, consequently, in its
vision of the past. In this picture, Russia has always been a great
nation, a mighty state, that protects/dominates numerous minorities,
including those that historically professed Islam, who lived happily
in the shadow of the broad wings of the Russian eagle.
This historical construction is increasingly challenged by Muslim
intellectuals who have constructed their own vision of the present
and the past, one which resonates among the Muslim masses. They, for
a variety of reasons, are increasingly disinclined to be fused in the
Russian melting pot. One of the major reasons why ethnic minorities
and newcomers - and local Russians - do not usually see much difference
between bona fide citizens of the Federation and foreign nationals who
are not fused with ethnic Russians - is the endless harassment. Even
those members who had not only lived in Russia but also in Moscow
for generations have found themselves in trouble.
While deciding to have my shoes polished during one of my recent
trips to Moscow, I encountered an Assyrian, a member of one of the
small and little-known ethnic groups in Russia. The Russian Assyrians
have historically been engaged in shoe polishing and repair for
generations. A portly Assyrian woman complained to me that life
for her and the entire Assyrian community became uneasy after the
collapse of the USSR. Some of her complaints actually indicated that
the Russian melting pot is still able to absorb some isolated groups of
minorities. She said that Assyrians in Moscow were isolated. She said
that their priest came from Iraq, but that local Assyrians could not
understand him. And she ended her litany with a gloomy statement to the
effect that God had punished them for the brutality of the past. The
isolation of the small Assyrian community seems to be leading to the
natural process of slow assimilation. She said that while she knew
the language, her children and grandchildren were assimilating.
Although the Russian melting pot seems to be working, at least
in the case of the small and isolated Assyrian community, it has
still been unable completely to absorb the Assyrians and other small
minorities, even when they become thoroughly Russified both culturally
and linguistically. The reason for this is the endless harassment by
ethnic Russians. Increasingly, even those ethnic minorities who speak
Russian as their own language find it hard to avoid the notion that it
is blood/race that really counts. The sense of alienation from ethnic
Russians reinforces this mood among the various ethnic groups.They
often have no sense of solidarity and frequently regard one another
with suspicion. My Assyrian interlocutor complained that before the
collapse of the USSR everyone was treated well; but now, she says,
she is taken for Armenian, and harassed. She complains that she is
a grassroots Muscovite and, thus, not just by law but even more by
a sort of informal tradition, has a right to live in Moscow and not
be treated as a newcomer from the Caucasus.
If even the natives and Russian-speaking minorities with no accent
could be harassed, this was even more the case with those people
who came from the ethnic enclaves of the Russian Federation, or what
Russians call the "near abroad", with their limited linguistic skills
and clear differences from Russians in habits and culture. One
of my Moscow market acquaintances of Turkic origin complained
that Russians did not like them and accused them of all kinds of
crimes. In some cases, the harassment turned to actual violence. A
student from India whom I met in Ekaterinburg told me that he "loved"
Russian culture: but he was beaten severely by skinheads and spent
some time in hospital. He was also assaulted in Moscow, and he knew
of several similar cases. The alienation from ethnic Russians is a
powerful incentive for minorities, including those who profess Islam,
to create their own alternative vision of history as the ideological
framework for their conflict with Russians.
Alternative vision of history
The challenge to semi-official and official Russian history came about
in a variety of ways. One of these interpretations, while implying that
Muslims and Orthodox Russian, indeed, lived together for centuries,
stressed that Muslims were not second fiddle. On the contrary,
they played a crucial role in the creation of Russian/Eurasian
civilizations. This reshaping of the past started with a reevaluation
of the beginning of Russian history. In this interpretation, Russian
history did not begin in Orthodox Kievan Russia but actually in Turkic
Muslim Volga Bulgaria, with the ancestors of the Tatar people. It
was the Bulgarians who faced the first onslaught of Mongols and thus
reduced their destruction of the Slavic land on the West and Europe
in general.
At the same time, in another interpretation - and, here, the Mongols
re-emerge as a positive force - it was the Mongols/Tatars who
destroyed the forces of the West that aimed to conquer Russia. It
was the Mongols/Tatars who played the crucial role in defeating the
"dog knights" in the Battle of Ice in 1242. The Golden Horde, the
Tatar-Mongol empire that ruled over Russia for more than 200 years,
was the umbrella that made it possible for Russia to flourish.
These ideologists harken back to the Eurasianist paradigm. Still,
in this interpretation, there are certain unique elements. In this
interpretation, the Tatars/Mongols, of course, actually became a
civilizing and peculiarly europeanizing force. In fact, according to
this paradigm, in future years both Bulgarians and Tatars/Mongols
spread education, industry and tolerance, regardless of creed and
ethnicity. The Tatars emerge here as Europeans on the outskirts
of Europe, shedding a civilizing light on the backward, brutish,
intolerant and - actually - Asiatic Russians who in their political
culture manifested the worst elements of "Asiatism." The Tatars and
other Muslim peoples played a continuously crucial role in protecting
Russia in upheavals and wars from the 17th century to the present day.
Another paradigm implies a different vision of Orthodox Russian/Muslim
relations. This theory discards the notion of peaceful cooperation
between them and emphasizes the Russians' domination. In this paradigm,
the benign nature of Russia's actions was totally discarded. Instead
of vicious Asiatics who fell upon the peaceful Russians, a popular
theme among some nationalistic writers for a long time, it was the
vicious Russians who fell upon the peaceful Muslims.
This story began with Russia's conquest of Kazan in 1552, evolved
with the conquest of Siberia, and reached its climax in the 18th-19th
centuries with the genocidal conquest of the Caucasus, where the
Muslims were massacred en masse. The brutal tactics of the Soviet
regime in this respect were simply a continuation of centuries-old
tradition. The question is, of course, to what degree this intellectual
construction penetrated the minds of the Russian minority masses. One
can assume, at least from the anecdotal evidence, that this did indeed
take place.
Conclusion
What is the practical implication of these different visions of
the past and the present? It clearly indicates that deep problems
exist: the conflict between Russians and the state's various ethnic
minorities. It might well be argued that these problems could be
ignored or marginalized, for they have always existed. Still, there
is reason for concern. First, these conflicts/tensions could safely be
ignored only if the state were to maintain its absolute authority and
no crisis lay ahead. Secondly, even if the state maintained its grip
over society and dealt quickly with occasional revolts, as in Kondopoga
and Stavropol, the demographics - the increase of the proportion of
minorities in the Russian population - could well lead to problems
in the future, regardless of the viability of Russia. And for this
reason the images of the past and, consequently, of the present,
might be seen in hindsight as a sign of things to come.
By Dr. Dmitry Shlapentokh www.watchdog.cz
Dr. Dmitry Shlapentokh is Associate Professor of History at Indiana
University South Bend, USA, and a regular contributor to Prague
Watchdog.